O. ABSIRACr ~ne aim of this paper is to present parts of our system [2] , which is to construct a database out of a narrative natural la~ text. We think the parts are of interest in their o~. The paper consists of three sections: (I) We give a detailed description of the PROLOG -implementation of the parser which is based on the theory of lexical functional grammar (I/V.). The parser covers the fragment described in [1,94].
O. ABSIRACr ~ne aim of this paper is to present parts of our system [2] , which is to construct a database out of a narrative natural la~ text. We think the parts are of interest in their o~. The paper consists of three sections: (I) We give a detailed description of the PROLOG -implementation of the parser which is based on the theory of lexical functional grammar (I/V.). The parser covers the fragment described in [1, 94] .
I.e., it is able to analyse constructions involving functional control and long distance dependencies. We will to show that -PROLOG provides an efficient tool for LFG-implementation: a phrase structure rule annotated with ftmctional schemata like~ M~ w~is ~^ be interpreted as, first, identifying the special grmr, m/tical relation of subject position of any sentence analyzed by this clause to he the h~ appearing in it, and second, as identifying all g~,~mtical relations of the sentence with those of the VP. This ~iversal interpretation of the ~tavariables ~ and & corresponds to the universal quantification of variables appearing in PROl/~uses. The procedural ssm~ntios of PROLOG is such that the instantietion of the ~ariables in a clause is inherited from the instantiation given by its subgoals, if they succeed. Thus there is no need for a separate component which solves the set of equations obtained by applying the I/G algorithm.
-there is a canonical way of translati~ LFG into a PROLOG progz~,~. (II) For the se~ntic representation of texts we use the Discourse Representation q]neory developped by Psns [,a~p. At present the implerentation includes the fragment described in [4] .
In addition it analyses different types of negation and certain equi-and raising-verbs. We postulate some requirenents a semantic representation has to fulfill in order to he able to analyse whole texts. We show how K~p's theory meets these requirements by analyzing sample disconrses involving amaphoric ~'s. (III) Finally we sketch how the parser formalism ca~ be augmented to yield as output discourse representation structures. To do this we introduce the new notion of 'logical head' in addition to the LFG notion of 'grmmmtical head'. reason is the wellknown fact that the logical structure of a sentence is induced by the determiners and not by the verb which on the other hand determines the thenatic structure of the sentence. However the verb is able to restrict quantifier scope anbiguities or to induce a preference ordering on the set of possible quantifier scope relations. ~-erefore there must he an interaction between the grammatical head and the logical head of a phrase.
I. A PROLOG ~W[/94~NTATION OF LFG
A main topic in AI research is the interaction between different components of a systen.
But insights in this field are primarily reached by experience in constructing a complem system. Right frcm the beginning, however, one should choose formalisms which are suitable for a s~nple and transparent transportion of information. We think LFG meets this requirenent.
The formalism exhibiting the analysis of a sentence c~ he expanded in a simple way to contain entries which are used during the parse of a whole text, for example discourse features like topic or domain dependent knowledge conming from a database associated with the lexicon. Since I/G is a kind of u~_ification grammar it allows for constructing patterns which enable the following sentences to refine or to change the content of these disc~irse features. Knowledge gathered by a preceding sentence can he used to lead the search in the lexicon by demanding that certain feature values match. In short we hope that the nearly tmiform status of the different description tools allows simple procedures for the expansion and mani~Llation by other components of the syst~n. But this was a look ahead.
Let us mow come to the less a~bitious task of implementing the grmmmr of [i,~4] . iexical functional g~ (LFG) is a theory that extends phrase structure ~L~,mrs without using transformations. It ~nphasizes the role of the grammatical f~Ictions and of the lexicon. Another powerful formalism for describing natural languages follows from a method of expressing grammars in logic called definite clause gz~,srs (DOG). A DOG constitutes a PROIOG programne. We %~nt to show first, how LFG can he tr-amslated into DOG and second, that PROLOC provides an efficient tool for I/D-Implementation in that it allows for the construction of functional structures directly during the parsing process. I.e. it is not necessary to have seperate components which first derive a set of f~mctional equations from the parse tree and secondly generate an f-str~ture by solving these equations. Let us look at an example to see how the LFG machinery works. We take as the sample sentence "a w~man expects an anerican to win'. ql%e parsing of the sentence proceeds along the following lines.
~ne phrase structure rules in (i) generate the phrase structure tree in (2) (without considering the schemata written beneath the rule elements).
..I. s ~_~ v P FET N a worn expects & ~me~'ioan to win the c-stru~ture will be annotated with the functional schemata associated with the rules . ~he schemata found in the lexical entries are attached to the leave nodes of the tree. ~his is shown in (3).
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Then the tree will he Indexed. ~e indices instantiate the upand down-arrows. An up-arrow refers to the node dominating the node the schema is attached to. A d~n-~ refers to the node which carries the f~ctlonal schema. Tns result of the instantiation process is a set of ftmctional equations.
We have listed part of them in 44). TOe solving of these equations yields the f~ctional str~zture in (5).
It is composed of grammtical ftmction naras, s~antic forms and feature symbols. The crucial elements of LFG (in contrast to transformational g~n.ar)are the grammticel functiens like SL~J, OBJ, XCCMP and so on. The fu%ctional structure is to he read as containing pointers frem the functio~ appearing in the semantic forms to the corresponding f-structures. The ~,,atical functions assumed by LFG are classified in subcategorizable (or governable) and nonm~*zategorizable functions. TOe subcategorizable ones are those to which lexlcal items can make reference.
TOe item "expects' for e~smple subcategorizes three functions, but only the material inside the angled brackets list the predicate's smmntic arguments. X{I~P and XAIU are ~/~e only open grammtical functions, i.e. ,they can denote functionally controlled clauses.
In our exhale this phenomena is lexically induced by the verb "expects'. Tnis is expressed by its last sch~mm "(%XC[~P SUBJ)=(@OBJ)". It has the effect that the 0]~of the sentence will becmme the SUBJ of the XC~MP, that me.%ns in our example it becomes the argument of d~e predicate 'win'. Note that the analysis of the sentence "a woman promises an ~merlcan to win" would differ in two respects. First the verb 'prcmlses' lists all the three ft~ctions subcategorized by it in its sem~ntlc argument structure. And second 'premises" differs from "expects' just in its f~mctional control schema, i.e., here we find the equation "(#X{~MP SUBJ)=(A~SLBJ) '' yielding an arrow from the SL~J of the XC~MP to the SUBJ of the sentence in the final f-structure. An f-structure must fulfill the following conditions in order to be a solution -uniqueness: every f-nane which has a value has a ~ique value -completeness:the f-structure must contain f-values for all the f-na~es subcategorized by its predicate -coherence: all the subcate~orizable fzmctions the f-structure contains must be ~tegorised by its predicate The ability of lexical irons to determine the features of other items is captured by the trivial equations. Toey propagate the feature set which is inserted by the lexical item up the tree. For e~mple the features of the verb become features of the VP end the features of the VP become features of S. The ~llqueness principle guarantees that any subject that the clause contains will have the features required by the verb. The trivial equation makes it also possible that a lexical item, here the verb, can induce a f~mctional control relationship he~ different f-structures of the sentence. An ~mportant constraint for all references to ftmctions and fonctional features is the principle of f~mctional locality: designators in lexical and grmm~tical schemata can specify no more than two iterated f~mction applications. Our claim is t|mt using DCG as a PROLOG programe the parsing process of a sentence according to the LFG-theory can be done more efficiently by doing all the three steps described above simultaneously. Why is especially PROLOG useful for doing this? In the a;motated e-structure of the LFG theory the content of the f~mctional equations is only '"~wn" by the node the equation is annotated to and by the immediately dominating node. The memory is so to speak locally restricted. Thus during the parse all those bits of info~tion have to be protocolled for so~e other nodes. This is done by means of the equations. In a PROIOG programme however the nodes turn into predicates with arEun*~ts.
Tns arguments could be the same for different predicates within a clause. Therefore the memory is '~orizentall~' not restricted at all. Furthermore by sharing of variables the predicates which are goals ca~ give infon~tion to their subgoals.
In short, once a phrase structure grammr has been translated into a PROIOG pragraune every node is potentially able to grasp information from any other node. Nonetheless the parser we get by embedding the restricted LFG formalism Into the highly flexible r~G formalism respects the constraints of Lexlcal ftmctlonal granular. Another important fact is that LFG tells the PROIOG programmer in an exact manner what information the purser needs at which node and just because this information is purely locally represented in the LFG formalism it leads to the possibility of translating 12G into a PROLOG programme in a ca~mical wey. We have said that in solving the equations LFG sticks together informations ¢mmiog from different nodes to build up the final output. To mirror this the following PROLOG feature is of greatest importance. For the construction of the wanted output during the parsing process structures can he built up piecsneal, leaving unspecified parts as variables. The construction of the output need not he strictly parallel to the application of the corresponding rules. Variables play the role of placeholders for structures which are found possibly later in the parsing process. A closer look at the verb entries as formulated by LFG reveals that the role of the f~mction names appearing there is to function as placeholders too. To summarize: By embedding the restricted LFG formalism into the hlgly flexible definite clause grammr fonmg/ismwemake llfe easier. Nonetheless the parser we get respects the constraints which are formulated by the LFG theory. Let us now consider some of the details. Xhe n~les under (i) are transformed into the PROLOG programme in (6). (* indicates the variables.) (6) S (*el0 *ell *outps) <--NP (*el0 *c12 *featnp *outpnp) VP (*c12 *ell (SIBJ (*outpnp *featnp)) T~ *outpa) VP (*clO *ell *outpsubj *featv *outps) <--v (*cent (~o~mmb/~) *leafy *outps) F~/~IP (*el0 *¢12 OBJ ~ *ill)
Ifun£tional FA(~ (*¢12 *c13 OBJ2 ~ *~) controll FAf~=P (*el3 *el40BL ~ *~)
FA¢~" (*¢14 *ell *oont xcem ~ nil) l i~iAst~ FAOJP' (*clO *ell (*gf *cont) *gf ) . *i0) *10) ~-VP" (*¢I0 *ell *cont *outpxcomp) NP (*el0 *ell *ontpnp) <-lET (*el0 *¢ii *ontpdet) N (*outpdet *outpnp) We use the content of the function assigning equations to build up parts of the whole f-structure during the parsing process. Crur~al for this is the fact dmt every phrase has a ~mique category, called its head, with the property that the functional features of each phrase are identified with those of its head. The head category of a phrase is characterized by d~e assignment of the trivial ft~%ctional-equation and by the property of being a major category, ql%e output of each procedure is constructed by the subprocedure corresponding to the head. ~ means that all information resulting from the other subprooedures is given to that goal. ll~is is done by the 'outp' variables in the programme.
ThUS the V procedure builds up the f-structure of the sentence. Since VP is the head of the S rule the VP procedure has an argument variable for the SUB7 f-structure. Since V is the head of the VP rule this variable together with the structures coming fore the sister nodes are given to V for the construction of the final output.
As a consequence our output does not contain pointers in contrast to Bresnan' s output. Rather the argument positions of the predicates are instantiated by the indicated f-stmmtures. For each category there is a fixed set of features, l~e head category is able to impose restrictions on a fixed subset of that feature set. This subset is placed on a prominent position, l~e corresponding feature values percolating up towmrds the head category will end up in the sate position d&~anding that their values agree. Tois is done by the ' feat" variables. The ~aiqueneas condition is trivially fulfilled since the passing around of parts of the f-structure is done by variables, and PROIOG instantiates a variable with at most one value.. (7) V ( (V(KEP (SL~J (*outpobj *featobj)))
Ifenctional control] ((S[BJ (*outpsubj (SG 3))) ~ Icheck listl (OBJ (*outpobj *featobJ)) (XC~MP *outpxcomp)) +'-I output I ((TK~SE m~) (reED "EXPECt (*outpaubj *outpxcemp)')) ) ~he checking of the completeness and coherence condition is done by the Verb procedure. (7) shows the PROLOG assertion corresponding to the lexical entry for 'expects'.
In every assertion for verbs there is a list containing the g~=m~,~tical ftmctions subcategorized by the verb. This is the second argument in (7), called "check list'. ~ list is passed around during the parse. ~lis is done by the list umderlined with waves in (6). Every subcategorlzable f~action appearing in the sentence must be able to shorten the llst. Tnis guarantees coherence.
In the end the list must have diminished to NIL. This guarantees completene&s. As can be seen in (7) a by-product of this passing around the check list is to bring the values of the grammtical functions subcategorized by the verb down to the verb's predicate argument structure. To handle famctional control the verb entry contains an argument to encode the controller. Ibis is the first argument in (7). lhe procedure ~li.ch delivers XC~MP (here the VP" procedure) receives d~is variable (the underlined variable *cont in (6) Toe superscript S of the one controller indicates that the corresponding controlee has to be found in a S-rooted control domain whereas the [-kwh] controlee for the other controller has to be found beneath a ~ node. Finally the box around the S-node reeds to be explained. It indicates the fact that the node is a boLmding node. Kaplan/Bresnan state the following convention A node M helor~s to a control domain with root node R if and only if R dominates M and there are no bo~iding nodes on the path from M up to but not including R. Tnia c~nvention prevents constructions like the one in (ii).
The girl wondered what the m~se asked who saw Long distance control is haldle by the programme using a long distance controller list, enriched at some special nodes with new oontrollers, passed down the tree and not allowed to go further at the bounding nodes. S ((*oL!t~np*f_eatnj~ !S_N~)) ~ *outpsc) Every time a controlne is found its subscript has to match the corresponding entry of the first menber of the controller list. If this happens the first element will be deleted from the list. The fact that a controlee can only match the first elenent reflects the crossed dependency constraint. *clO is the input controller variable of the S" procedure in (12). *cll is the output variable. *clO is expanded by the [4wh] controller within the NP subgoal. This controller must find its controllee during d~e e~ecution of the NP goal.
Note that the output variable of the NP subgoal is identical with the output variable of the main goal and that the subgoal S" does have different controller lists. ~ reflects the effect of the box aroLmd the S-node, i.e. no controller coming do,retards can find its controlee inside the S-prncedure.
l~e only controller going into the S goal is the one introduced below the NP node with dnmsln root S. Clearly the output variable of S has to be nil. There are rules which allow for certain controllers to pass a boxed node Bresna~Kaplan state for example the rule in (13).
This rule has the effect that S-rooted contollers are allowed to pass the box. Here we use a test procedure which puts only the contollers iedexed by S onto the controller list going to the S goal. ~ereby we obtain the right treatment of sentence (14). (14) the girl wondered who John believed that Mary claimed that the baby saw . In a corres~eding manner the complex NP 'whose playmate's nurse" of sentence (8) is analysed.
II. SEMANTIC REPRESD~jLTION
As senantic representation we use the D(iscourse) R(epresentation) T(heory) developped by Hans Yamp [4] . I.e. we do not adopt the semantic theory for L(exical) F(unctional) C~rammr) proposed by Per-Kristian Halverson [2] . Halverson translates the f~nctional structures of LFG into so-called semantic structures being of the same structural nature, namely scyclic graphs. The semlntin structures are the result of a translation procedure which is based on the association of formulas of intensional logic to the semantic forms appearing in the functional structure. The reason not to take this approach will be explained by postulating some requirements a se~anclc representation has to fulfill in order to account for a processing of texts. Tnen we will show that these requlr~ents are rP~I]y necessary by analysing some sample sente,ces and discourses.
It will turn out that ~T accoante for them in an intuitively fully satisfactory ~y. Because we cannot review [RT in detail here the reader should consult one of the papers explaining the ftmdanentals of the theory (e.g. [~] ), or he should first look at the last paragraph in which an outline is given of how our parser is to be extended in order to yield an IRS-typed output -instead of the 'traditional' (semantic) flmctional structures. The basic building principle of a semantic representation is to associate with every signlfic2mt lexical entry (i.e., every entry which does contribute to the truthcondldtlonsl aspect of the meaning of a sentence) a semantic structure. Compositional principles, then, will construct the semantic representation of a sentence by combining these se~antlc structures according to their syntactic relations. The desired underlying principle is that the smmntlc structures associated with the semantic forms should not be. changed during the composition process. To vat it dif6erently:
one ~nts the association of the semantic structures to be independent of the syntactic context in which the semantic form appears. This requirement leads to difficulties in the tradition of translating sentences into formulas of e.g. predicate or intentional logic. respectively. ~le problem is that the definite description "a woman" reemerges as universally quantified in the logical representation-and there is no way out, because the prono~m "she" has to be boLmd to the wommn in question. I~T provides a general acco~mt of the meaning of indefinite descriptions, conditionals, tmiversally quantified noun phrases and anaphoric pronoun, s.t. our first requirement is satisfied. 1~e semantic represEmtations (called nRs's) which are assigned to sentences in which such constructions jointly appear have the truth conditions which our intuitions attribute to them. The second reas~ why we decided to use I~R as semantic formalism for LFG is that the constraction principles for a sentence S(i) of a text D = S(1), .... S(n) are fozmulated with respect to the semantic representation of the prec~Ing text S(1),... ,S(i-l).
1~erefore the theory can accotmt for intersentential semantic relationships in the same way as for intrasentential ones. ~ is the second requirement: a s~antic representation has to represent the discourse as a whole and not as the mere union of the s~antic representations of its isolated sentences. A third requirenent a senantlc representation has to fulfill is the reflection of configurational restrictions on anaphoric links: If one embeds sentence (2) into a conditional (6) *If every man who admires a woman kisses her then she is stressed the anaphoric link in (2) is preserved.
But (6) does -for configurational reasons -not allow for an anaphoric relation between the "she" and "a woman". The same happens intersententially as shown by (7) If Jo~m admires a woman tl~n he kisses her. *She is enraged. A last requirement we will stipulate here is the following: It is neccessary to draw inferences already during the construction of the semantic representation of a sentence S(i) of the discourse.
The inferences must operate on the semantic representation of the already analyzed discourse S(1),... ,S(i-l) as well as on a database containing the knowledge the text talks about. ~ requirement is of major importance for the analysis of definite descriptions. Consider (8) Pedro is a farmer. If a woman loves him then he is happy. Mary loves Pedro. The happy farmer marries her in which the definite description "the happy farme•' is used to refer to refer to the individual denoted by "Pedro". In order to get this llnk one has to infer that Pedro is indeed a happy farmer and that he is the only ore. If this were not the case the use of the definite description would not he appropriate. Such a deduction mechanism is also needed to analyse sentence (9) John bought a car. the engine has 160 horse powers In this case one has to take into account some ~nowledge of the world, nanely the fact that every car has exactly one engine. To illustrate the ~y the s~mmtic representation has to be interpreted let us have a brief look at the text-~RS for the sample discourse (8)
ThUS a IRS K consists of (i) a set of discourse referents: discourse individuals, discourse events, discourse propositions, etc. (il) a set of conditions of the following types -atomic conditions, i.e. n-ary relations over discourse referents -complex conditions, i.e. n-ary relations (e.g.
--> or :) over sub-~S's and discourse referents (e.g. K(1) --> K(2) or p:K, where p is a discourse proposition) A whole ~S can be tmderstoed as partial model representing the individuals introduced by the discourse as well as the facts and rules those individuals are subject to. The truth conditions state that a IRS K is true in a model M if there is a proper imbedding from K Into M. Proper embedding is defined as a f~mction f from the set of discourse referents of K in to M s.t. (i) it is a homomorphism for the atomic conditions of the IRS and (il) -for the c~se of a complex condition K(1) --> I((2) every proper embedding of K(1) that extends f is extendable to a proper embedding of K(2).
for the case of a complex condition p:K the modelthenretlc object correlated with p (i.e. a proposition if p is a discourse proposition, an event if p is a discourse event, etc.) must be such that it allows for a proper embedding of K in it. Note that the definition of proper embedding has to be made more precise in order to adapt it to the special s~nantica one uses for propositional attitudes. We cannot go into details bare. Nonet/~lese the truth condition as it stands should make clear the following: whether a discourse referent introduced implies existence or not depends on its position in the hierarchy of the IRS's. C/ven a nRS which is true in M then eactly those referents introduced in the very toplevel [RS imply existence; all others are to he interpreted as ~iversally quantified, if they occur in an antecedent IRS, or as existentially quantified if they occur in a consequent BRS, or as having opaque status if they occur in a ~S specified by e.g. a discourse proposition. Tnus the role of the hierarchical order of the BRS's is to build a base for the definition of truth conditions. But furthemnore the hierarchy defines an accessibility relation, which restricts the set of possible antecedents of anaphorie NP's. Ibis aceessibiltity relation is (for the fra~nent in [~]) defined as follows: For a given sub-ERS K0 all referents occurring in NO or in any of the n~S's in which NO is embedded are accessible. Furthermore if NO is a consequent-~S then the referents occurring in its corresponding antecedent I]~S on the left are accessible too. This gives us a correct trea~aent for (6) and (7). For the time being -we have no algorithm which restricts and orders the set of possible anaphorie antecedents ~-*-ording to contextual conditions as given by e.g. (5) John is reading a book on syntax and Bill is reading a book on s~-oatics o a paperback J Therefore our selection set is restricted only by the accessibility relation and the descriptive content of the anaphoric NP" s. Of course for a~apheric pronouns this content is reduced to a minimum, namely the grm~rstical features associated to them by the lexical entries. This accounts e.g. for the difference in acceptability of (I0) and (II). (I0) Mary persuaded every man to shave |dmself (II) *~4ary promised every man to shave himself The ~S's for (i0) and (II) show that beth discourse referents, the one for '~r~' and the one for a '~an", are accessible from the position at which the reflexive prex~an has to be resolved. But if the '~dmselP' of (ii) is replaced by x it cannot he identified with y having the (not explicitely shown) feature female.
Ii0")I Y *~')/ / mary = y / ipers~de(y~,p)l / ~ prom~(y~,p)
Definite dese~tue of the semantic content of their co,mon-noun-phrases and the existence and ~niqeeness conditions presupposed by th~n. "~erefore in order to analyse definite descriptions we look for a discourse referent introduced in the preceding IRS for which the description holds and we have to check whether this descrition holds for one referent only. Our algorithm proceeds as follows: First we build up a small IRS NO encoding the descriptive content of the common-no~-phrase of the definite description together with its ~miqlmess and existency condition: El):
,%econd we have to show that we can prove I<0 out of the text-nRS of the preceeding discourse , with the restriction that only accessible referents are taken into account. The instantiation of *x by this proof gives us the correct anteoedent the definite description refers to. Now we forget about NO and replace the antecedent discourse referent for the definite noun phrase to get the whole text-IRS (8'). Of course it is possible that the presuppositions are not mentioned explicitely in the discourse but follow implicitely from the text alone or from the text together with the knowledge of the domain it talks about. So in cases like (9) John bought a car. The engine has 260 horse powers Pere the identified referent is functionally related to referents that are more directly accessible, nmne_ly to John's car. Furthermore such a functional dependency confers to a definite description the power of introducing a new discourse referent, nanely the engine which is functionally determined by the car of which it is part. ~ shifts the task from the search for a direct antecedent for "the engine" to the search for the referent it is f%mctionelly related to. But the basic mechanism for finding this referent is the same deductive mechanism just outlined for the '~lappy farme~" example.
III. ~CWARIB AN ~f~ ~ "GRAMMATICAL PARSIAK~' AND "lOGICAL P~RSIN~' In this section we will outline the principles anderlying the extension of our parser to produce ~S's as output. Because none of the fragments of ~T contains Raising-and Equi-verbs taking infinitival or that-complements we are confronted with the task of writing construction rules for such verbs. It will turn out, however, that it is not difficult to see how to extend ~T to eomprise such constructions. "ibis is due to the fact that using LFG as syntactic base for IRT -and not the categorial syntax of Kamp -the ~raveling of the thematic relations in a sentence is already accomplished in f-structure. Therefore it is streightfo~rd to formulate construction rules which give the correct readings for (i0) and (ii) of the previous section, establish the propositional equivalence of pairs with or without Raising, Equi (see (I), (2)), etc. (I) John persuaded Mary to come (2) John persuaded ~%~ry that she should come let us first describe the BRS construction rules by the f~niliar example (3) every man loves a woman Using Ksmp's categorial syntax, the construction rules operate top down the tree. The specification of the order in which the parts of the tree are to he treated is assumed to be given by the syntactic rules. I.e. the specification of scope order is directly determined by the syntactic construction of the sentence.
We will deal with the point of scope ambiguities after baying described the ~y a BRS is constructed. Our description -operating bottom up instead top down -is different from the one given in [4] in order to come closer to the point we want to make. But note that this differei~ce is not ~l genuine one. ~hus according to the first requiranent of the previous section we assume that to each semantic from a semantic structure is associated. For the lexical entries of (3) 
every --> [ [-x--] -. [-~ [
loves --> love(*,*) Ehe semantic structures for the common nouns and the verbs ere n-place predicates. The structure for "a" is a IRSwith discourse individual v. introduced and conditions not yet specified, q~e entry for "every' is a ~S with no discourse individuals introduced an the toplevel. It contains however a compl~ condition ED --> KI s.t a discourse individusl x is intreduced in ~3 and both ED and K1 contain any other conditions. The IRS constroction rules specify how these s~nantic structures are to be ecmbined by propagating them up the tree. ~e easiest way to illustrate that is to do it by t_he following picture (for the case of marrow scope readin~ of '% woman"): The picture should make clear the way we ~mnt to extend the parsing mechanism described in section 1 in order to produce ~S's as output ~ no more f-stroctures: instead of partially instantiated f-structures determined by the lexical entries partially instsntiated IRS's are passed eround the tree getting aocc~plished by unification. Toe control mechanism of LFG will automatically put the discourse referents into the correct argument position of the verb. lhus no additional work has to be done for the g~=~,~atical relations of a sentence. But what about the logical relations? Recall that each clause has a unique head end that the functional features of each phrase are identified with those of its head. For (3) the head of S -~> NPVP is the VP and the head of VP --> V NP is the V. %h~m the outstanding role of the verb to determine and restrict the grmmmtical'relations of the sentence is captured. (4) , however, shows that the logical relations of the sentence are mainly determined by its determiners, which are not ~eads of the NP-phrases and the NP~phrases thsmselves are not the heads of the VP-and S-phrase respectively.
To account foc this dichotomy we will call the syntactically defined notion of head "grammatical head" and we will introduce a further notion of "logical head" of a phrase. Of course, in order to make the definition work it has to be elaborated in a way that garantses that the logical head of a phrase is uniquely determied too. Consider (~) John pe.rsuaded an american to win (7) John expected an american to win for ~dch we propose the following ORS's |amerlcan(y) p: ~--~ [persuade(j ,y,p) hwin(y) The fact that (7) does not neccesserily imply existence of ~m 8merlcan whereas (6) does is triggered by the difference between Equl-and R~dslng-verbe.
Suppose we define the NP to he the logical hend of the phrase VP --> V NP VP I. ~ the logical relations of the VP would be those of the ~E ~. This amounts to incorporating the logical structures of the V and the VP ~ into the logical structure of the NP, which is for both (6) and (7) and thus would lead to the readings represented in (6") and (7"). 0onsequentiy (7") ~mlld not he produced. Defining the logical head to be the VP | would exclude the r~a~.gs (6") and (7"').
Evidently the last possibility of defining the logical head to be identical to the grammatical head, namely the V itself, seems to be the only solution. But this would block the construction already at the stage of unifying the NP-and VPhstructures with persuade(*,*,*) or expect(*,*). At first thought one easy way out of this dilemma is to associate with the lexical entry of the verb not the mere n-place predicate but a IRS containing this predicate as atomic condition, lhis makes the ~lification possible but gives us the following result: Of course ooe~is open to produce the set of ~S's representing (6) and (7). BUt this means that one has to work on (*)after having reached the top of the tree -a consequence that seems undesirable to us.
the only way out is to consider the logical head as not being uniquely identified by the mere phrase structure configurations. As the above example for the phrase VP --> V NP VP ~ shows its head depends on the verb class too. But we will still go further. We claim that it [s possible to make the logical head to additionslly depend on the order of the surface string, on the use of active and passive voice and probably others. Ibis will give us a preference ordering of the scope ambiguities of sentences as the following: -Every man loves a Woman -A Woman is loved by every man -A ticket is bought by every man -Every man bought a ticket %he properties of ~lification granmers listed above show that the theoretical frsm~ork does not impose any restrictions on that plan.
